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A HEIGHTENED STANDARD FOR LAND USE PERMITS




Coy Koontz Sr. wanted to build a small shopping center on a 3.7-
acre portion of a 14.9-acre tract he purchased in 1972.1 In an effort to
do so he applied for Wetlands Resource Management permits from
the St. John's River Water Management District because his parcel of
land had been deemed a wetland by the state of Florida.2 To obtain
the permits, Koontz had to mitigate the environmental effects of the
development, so he offered to grant the district an 11-acre conserva-
tion easement.3 The district responded that the easement was inade-
quate so it presented two options for Koontz to choose from in order
to satisfy the district's goal of mitigating development effects.' Koontz
could either reduce his planned development from 3.7-acres to one
acre and create a conservation easement for the other 13.9 acres or,
he could develop the 3.7 acre portion as he planned if he paid for
improvements to 50 acres of district owned wetlands several miles
away.5
Koontz believed that these options were an extreme form of mitiga-
tion.' The district's denial of his permits without his submission to
these excessive demands prevented him from developing his land.
This substantially decreased its value, which constituted a taking by
the government without just compensation, under the fifth amend-
1. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591-92
(2013); John D. Echeverria, A Legal Blow to Substantial Development, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/a-
legal-blow-to-sustainabledevelopment.html.
2. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
3. See id. at 2592-93.
4. See id. at 2593.
5. Id. (stating that Koontz was asked to hire contractors to make improve-
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ment of the U.S. Constitution.' Consequently, Koontz sued the water
management district asserting that the demands forced Koontz to give
up his right to develop his property without providing just compensa-
tion.' The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Koontz stating that the
money demanded for the improvement of state owned wetlands to
approve Koontz's land use permit must have an essential nexus be-
tween the money demanded and the regulatory purpose furthered,
while also having a rough proportionality to the harm that is caused
by Koontz's proposed land use.1 o
This holding will affect any section of government that regulates
land as well as property owners seeking to exercise their property
rights." It will affect how the government and property owners will
negotiate and the mitigating measures used in order to grant or re-
ceive land use permits.' 2 Furthermore, it will change how the govern-
ment raises funds necessary for infrastructure improvements as a
consequence of land development, it will affect its power to regulate
land, and above all, it will increase litigation over property rights.'
II. Background
A. The Evolution of a Taking
The holding in Koontz is an extension of the Takings Clause in the
Fifth Amendment.14 The Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment
states that private property cannot be taken for the purpose of public
use without fairly compensating the owner.' A taking is defined by
the Supreme Court as a direct appropriation or a physical invasion of
private property.' 6 The Supreme Court expounded on this idea in
saying that a regulatory action could be a taking." Specifically, a tak-
ing could occur where the government requires an owner to suffer a
permanent physical invasion of his property or if regulations com-
pletely deprive the property owner of the economic benefits of the
property. 8 Furthermore, the government cannot condition a benefit
8. See id.
9. See id. at 2593-94.
10. Id. at 2600.
11. See Tejinder Singh, Opinion Recap: Broadening Property Owners' Right to Sue,
SCOTUSBLOG (April 1, 2014, 2:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=16
6657.
12. See discussion and accompanying notes infra Part II.
13. See discussion and accompanying notes infra Part II.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (citing United States v.
Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951)).
17. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) and Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1014 (1992)).
18. Id.
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on the surrender of a constitutional right." Building on this princi-
ple, the Supreme Court found that it violates the takings clause for the
government to demand a property right, like an easement, in ex-
change for approval of a land use permit application, where the ap-
proval is supposed to denote just compensation.2 0 While the
government may not take a property right without compensation, it
can nonetheless demand measures like conservation easements be-
cause it has an interest in regulating property within its jurisdiction."
B. The Nollan and Dolan Precedents
In order to allow the government to regulate property, exclusive of
the regulation becoming a taking without just compensation, the Su-
preme Court crafted two tests to apply to land use regulations in order
to prevent such regulations from becoming takings.22 In Nollan, the
Court required that the government demonstrate that a nexus exist
between the condition sought and the regulatory purpose that the
condition serves." The homeowners in Nollan wanted to renovate
their beachfront property and the state conditioned the approval of
the building permits on the homeowners granting an easement to the
state allowing the public access to two other public beaches.2 ' The
Court found that there was no connection between obtaining an ease-
ment to be used as a right of way by the public and restricting the
homeowners from building2 5 because the purpose of the restriction
was to prohibit any structures from blocking the public's view of the
coast, not affording a right of way to public beaches.
Seven years later the court fashioned a companion test to the essen-
tial nexus test of Nollan in Dolan.2 ' The companion test states that
there must exist a rough proportionality between the harm caused by
the new land use sought and the benefit obtained by the govern-
ment's requisite condition.2 1 In Dolan, the property owner had ap-
plied for redevelopment permits to double the size of the hardware
store on her property.29 The city conditioned approval of the permits
on the property owner's agreement to dedicate an easement for a
"greenway" which could be either a bike path or pedestrian walkway.so
19. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
20. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385
(1994)).
21. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
22. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 398 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at
841.
23. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
24. Id. at 828.
25. Id. at 837.
26. Id. at 828-29.
27. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 398.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 379.
30. Id.
2013] 73
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The court found that the condition to have a "greenway" was meant to
increase drainage of a 100-year flood plain on which the hardware
store was built, but forcing the property owner to grant an easement
for a bike path did not counteract the effects of increased water-im-
pervious surfaces from the development.31 Thus, there was no rough
proportionality between the purpose of the condition placed on the
property owner and the harm caused by her development." With
this, the Court established that both the "essential nexus" and "rough
proportionality" tests need to be overcome for it to be constitutional
to place a condition on the approval of a land use permit.3 3 Subse-
quently, the decision in Koontz now imposes these tests on money de-
manded from a land use permit applicant in order to grant
approval.34
III. Analysis
A. Affect of the Holding on Negotiations for Land Use Permits
Will the display of Koontz rejecting the water management district's
demands signal to other property owners that they are better off not
negotiating with the government on land use permits?35 From Koontz,
landowners can easily infer that if they think that the government's
demands are excessive they can refuse to negotiate and sue instead."
Landowners will have this incentive to sue because of the burden that
the government will have to comply with under Nollan and Dolan.
Furthermore, landowners are now incentivized to only offer the easi-
est and cheapest mitigation condition and if this is not accepted then
the landowner will feel empowered to sue. 8 Even the mere proposal
of a condition that does not meet the standards set forth in Nollan and
Dolan may trigger litigation." In response to the likelihood of in-
creased suits by landowners, government agencies are likely to reject
land use applications outright in an effort to protect themselves from
31. Id. at 403-04.
32. See id.
33. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591
(2013).
34. See id. at 2603.
35. See id. at 2599.
36. George Speir, Will Koontz Mean Big Changes or Business as Usual for Real Estate
Development in California, 24 MILLER & STARR, REAL ESTATE 1, 1 (2013).
37. See id.
38. Supreme Court Expands Takings Test, AM. PLAN. Ass'N NEWS RELEASE (APA)
June 25, 2013, http://www.planning.org/newsreleases/2013/jun25.htm.
39. Deborah M. Rosenthal, The Supreme Court Gets it Right on Takings - And
Wrong - A View from "Inside the Curtillage": The Property Owner's Perspective, THE
NAT'L LAw REVIEw (July 11, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/
supreme-court-gets-it-right-takings-and-wrong-view-inside-curtilage-proper
ty-owner-s.
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costly litigation." The landowner's incentive to resist demands and to
sue to invalidate the demands, coupled with the government's incen-
tive to deny applications for land use permits outright in order to pre-
clude lawsuits, will result in fewer land use permit negotiations.4 1 This
lack of negotiations could result in the harmful effects of property
developments going unmitigated, or a total stagnation in land
development.42
Conversely, does the ruling in Koontz expanding the tests in Nollan
and Dolan to monetary exactions have a positive impact on the land
use permit process?" A landowner who cannot accommodate grant-
ing an easement is likely to see that an exaction will work better for
him and thus will have an incentive to negotiate with the govern-
ment.44 Moreover, because of the heightened standard that govern-
ment conditions on land use permits must meet, landowners could
use this as leverage to force the government to the negotiating table
to secure conditions that are more amenable to their purposes.45 Al-
though there is a possibility that Koontz will lead to more negotiations,
this seems unlikely given the reaction the case has received regarding
the end of negotiation.46 Overall, as a result of Koontz there appears
to be more incentives not to negotiate the approval of land use per-
mits for both landowners and the government.47
B. Permit Process Impacts on Communities
As a way of offsetting increased development and to preserve wet-
lands, many communities attach fees to land use permits in order to
finance preservation efforts." However, these fees are now subject to
the standards in Nollan and Dolan, which will make it harder for com-
munities to raise money needed for preservation efforts to offset the
impacts of proposed developments." The burden placed on the ex-
40. John Echeverria, A Legal Blow to Substantial Development, N.Y. TIMES,June 26,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/a-legal-blow-to-sus
tainable-development.html?_r=0; Rosenthal, supra note 39.
41. See supra notes 36-40.
42. Id.
43. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600
(2013).
44. But see Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use
Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REv. 177, 202
(2006).
45. See, Lowell M. Rothschild & Matthew A. Haynie, Supreme Court Further Opens
the Door to Wetlands Taking Claims, THE NAT'L LAw REVIEw (June 26, 2013),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-further-opens-door-
to-wetlands-taking-claims.
46. Echeverria, supra note 40 (quoting reaction by Justice Kagan stating that
the ruling would cause a revolution).
47. See discussion supra Part III.A.
48. See Echeverria, supra note 40.
49. See id.
2013] 75
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actions will prevent developers and landowners from internalizing the
negative consequences of the proposed land use."o
The positive externality that will come from Koontz is that the stan-
dards that the government will have to comply with will require gov-
ernments to incorporate better guidelines for decision making
regarding land use policies." This will allow creative solutions for de-
velopments when it comes to environmental mitigation.52 Thus, there
are both positive and negative effects that come from applying the
Nollan and Dolan standards in Koontz to money exactions. 3
C. The Effect on Government Exactions on Developers
Previously, the government received exactions from developers in
the form of easements or dedications of land.54 Now governments
can use demands for funds related to a land use permit as a way to
raise capital if they comply with the Nollan and Dolan tests.55 This
shifts the burden of supporting the government's revenue stream
from the taxpayer to the developer.5 ' The benefit of having the mon-
etary burden placed on developers is that this is more in line with the
public's desire for developers to pay for the added improvements in
infrastructure their developments will require.5 ' Conversely, this in-
crease in exactions would be bad for developers, as they would bear
the brunt of government infrastructure costs instead of the
taxpayers.
With such a large amount of money to be gained by exactions from
land use permits, government officials will use these exactions to ex-
tort concessions from developers, 59 and those developers will have no
choice but to acquiesce to them.o However, developers and landown-
ers still play a role in the political process and they have legal and
political recourse in order to combat extortion and the unfair tax bur-
den that would be imposed on them."' The ruling in Koontz gives
50. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013).
51. Ali Paradis, Alfonso Dulcey, Brooks Kaufman, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District Appealed from the Florida Supreme Court Oral Argument:Jan.
15, 2013, FED. LAw., April 2013, at 80.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Steven J. Eagle, A Prospective Look at Property Rights and Environmental Regula-
tion, 20 GEO. MASON L. REv. 725, 764 (2013).
55. Id at 765-766.
56. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regula-
tion: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. Ruv. 177, 180 & 202
(2006).
57. Id. at 180.
58. Id. at 182.
59. Ali Paradis, Alfonso Dulcey, Brooks Kaufman, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District Appealed from the Florida Supreme Court Oral Argument: Jan.
15, 2013, FED. LAw., April 2013, at 80.
60. See id.
61. But see id.
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developers tools to fight the extortion of holding up approval of their
land use permits by the government for impermissible motives.62 Ac-
cordingly, applying the tests in Nollan and Dolan gives developers the
power to fight revenue burdens while allowing the government to fur-
ther the public interest by forcing developers to pay for the required
infrastructure expansion."
D. Effects of the Rule in Koontz on the Power of the Government
By adding the tests under Nollan and Dolan, the Supreme Court has
placed a higher burden on the government to comply with these stan-
dards in construing its exactions for land use permits." This mandate
accords the government very little deference in making land use regu-
latory policy, thereby superficially decreasing the government's
power." Additionally, the rules in Nollan and Dolan applied in Koontz
make it more difficult for the government to defend a taking attack
on one of its exactions because the government must supply qualita-
tive support showing both "rough proportionality" and "essential
nexus."" This has the effect of decreasing the government's power to
exert its authority through requiring exactions.
On the other hand, state governments have been using fees in place
of exactions for some time, making the compliance with Koontz merely
perfunctory and having no substantial impact on the power the gov-
ernment wields." Furthermore, the rationale of Koontz bolsters the
government's authority even when the court would find a violation of
the Nollan and Dolan standard." If the government was to offer an
62. See Supreme Court Decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Manage-
ment District, NAT'L Ass'N OF HOME BUILDERS, http://www.nahb.org/gener
ic.aspx?genericContentID=21 1111 (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
63. Michael T. Kersten, Exactions, Severability, and Takings: When Courts Should
Sever Unconstitutional Conditions from Development Permits, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REv. 279, 286 (2000).




66. Deborah M. Rosenthal, The Supreme Court Gets it Right on Takings - And
Wrong - A View from "Inside the Curtillage": The Property Owner's Perspective, THE
NAT'L LAw REvIEW (July 11, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/
supreme-court-gets-it-right-takings-and-wrong-view-inside-curtilage-proper
ty-owner-s.
67. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
68. But see Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use
Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REv. 177, 199
(2006) (defining in-lieu of fees as a prerequisite cash payment that was not
a fee required by submitting a land use permit); Deborah M. Rosenthal, The
Supreme Court Gets it Right on Takings - And Wrong - A View from "Inside the
Curtillage": The Property Owner's Perspective, THE NAT'L LAw REvIEw (Uly 11,
2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-gets-it-right-
takings-and-wrong-view-inside-curtilage-property-owner-s.
69. See Deborah M. Rosenthal, supra note 66.
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option that did not comply with Nollan and Dolan and the landowner
rejected that option, he would have neither conveyed property nor
money.70 Since there is no transfer of property, there is no taking.71
At this point in the litigation the excessive demand, in most cases,
would not go into effect and thus the compensation afforded to the
landowner if he should prevail is limited to a temporary taking rather
than one that is permanent.72 This effectively increases the govern-
ment's power in regulating land use permits since the damages for
losses in litigation would often be reduced.7 ' However, despite the
reductions in possible damages awards to property owners, there is an
overall decrease in the government's power based on the standards
emplaced by Koontz.7 1
IV. Conclusion
The decision by the Supreme Court in Koontz launches a new era in
the land use-permitting arena. Negotiations between landowners and
the government are impacted by both positive and negative incentives
to negotiate. However, the negatives outweigh the positives making
landowners less likely to negotiate.7 ' The effects of the application of
the stricter standard of Nollan and Dolan may lead to negative environ-
mental effects while improving the land use permitting process. As
a consequence of this higher standard, landowners may have a tool to
fight excessive exactions while governments will try to continue to
raise capital to fund increased infrastructure due to land develop-
ment.7 1 In this new battleground between landowners and the gov-
ernment, the Court has reduced the power of government to regulate
the landowners' activities by adding a more burdensome standard.
With the lack of incentives surrounding negotiations, the loss of envi-
ronmental mitigation measures, the new weapon that landowners pos-
sess in fighting exactions, and the reduced power of the government
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